CENTRAL AMERICAN FOOD SECURITY OUTLOOK

THIRD QUARTER 2025

OCTOBER 2025

ACTION AGAINST HUNGER

CONTENT

I. SUMMARY

In Central America, we may see a deterioration in food security in the coming period:

- In **Guatemala**, the CIF analysis predicts that **the population in Phase 3 or worse (Crisis or Emergency) will be 14% at the beginning of 2026**, followed by an **increase to 16% by April, due to seasonal food shortages, price pressures, and cumulative climate impacts.**

- In **Honduras**, the persistence of more than 1.6 million people in Crisis or Emergency (Phases 3 and 4) shows that recovery is limited and dependent on external conditions such as input prices and remittances.

- At the regional level, the combination of **rainfall deficits, uncertainty over rising tariffs, and a possible drop in remittances** from returning migrants threatens to reduce household incomes and food availability. High coffee prices offer some relief, but trade volatility and production costs limit their protective effect for small coffee growers.

- The risk of **increased poverty in 2026** is high, with the assumption that this could translate into **increased common violence and petty crime,** in the context of weak social protection programs and job insecurity.

PRIORITY VARIABLES MONITORED

- **Access, consumption, and affordability of food:** Food Consumption Score (FCS) and Reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI), prices of basic food basket, inflation rate.

- **Agroclimatic variables and agricultural production:** precipitation anomalies, early and late harvest yields, impact of pests, availability of corn and bean reserves.

- **Trade dynamics:** evolution of tariffs in the US and China, international coffee prices, market access.

- **Remittances and migration:** monthly volume of remittances (World Bank, central banks), regulatory changes in the US, internal/external migration rates as a subsistence strategy.

- **Social and risk indicators:** employment and income trends, reports of minor crimes, community violence, petty theft.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Continue to strengthen integrated early warning systems**, combining climate, market, and social monitoring (prices, migration, violence) to anticipate effects and actions.
2. **Strengthen social safety networks to make them adaptive**, linking cash transfer programs with rapid response mechanisms during periods of seasonal hunger.
3. **Support small farmers and cooperatives** with resistant seeds, access to affordable inputs to reduce dependence on short planting windows, and technical assistance.
4. **Support coffee growers** in income diversification strategies and access to alternative markets in the face of price and tariff volatility.
5. **Integrate food security and social cohesion**, promoting community spaces for violence prevention, youth employment, and mediation, parallel with food assistance interventions.
6. **Advocate in national and international forums** to warn about the humanitarian impact of restrictive trade and migration policies that directly affect the poorest Central American households.

II. OVERVIEW OF FOOD SECURITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

In **Guatemala**, between May and August 2025, an estimated 3.4 million people (19% of the national population) faced Crisis or worse (Phase 3+), around 400,000 more than in 2024. Eleven departments, including Alta Verapaz, Chiquimula, Huehuetenango, Petén, and Sololá, were classified as Phase 3 (Crisis). The analysis highlights the impact of climate variability, depletion of reserves, and high prices for basic food baskets. For the period September 2025–January 2026, the CIF projects a reduction to 2.6 million people (14%), with critical hotspots in Alta Verapaz, El Quiché, and Suchitepéquez. A further deterioration is projected to affect 3 million people (16%) in Phase 3 (Crisis) between February and April 2026, extending to the departments of Huehuetenango and Chiquimula.

In **Honduras**, the national CIF report indicates that between December 2024 and March 2025, there were 1.8 million people (18% of the population) in Crisis or Emergency (Phases 3 and 4), of which 116,000 were in Emergency (Phase 4). For April-July 2025, in the midst of seasonal hunger, 1.7 million (17%) were projected to be in Phase 3+, with the greatest severity in Gracias a Dios (50%), Colón (25%), and Atlántida (22%). Finally, for the period August-November 2025, 1.6 million people were projected to be in Phase 3, concentrated mainly in the departments of Lempira and Gracias a Dios.

In the tri-national region of the Lempa River (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador), 100,000 people were reported to be in crisis or worse (16% of the population analyzed) between March and May 2025, with a projected increase to 139,000 (23%) in June-September. The Ch'orti' micro-region (Chiquimula, Guatemala) is the most affected, with up to 35% of its population in Phase 3+.

The Food Consumption Score (PCA), a complementary indicator used to characterize the severity of household food insecurity in CIF analyses, is one of the indicators monitored by PREDISAN, which produces monthly estimates (nowcasting) at the departmental and municipal levels throughout Central America. PREDISAN's agroclimatic information reported anomalies in the precipitation index with negative effects on the production of basic grains in specific areas of Guatemala and Honduras between May and August 2025.

Complementarily, FEWS NET reports (July–August 2025) document rainfall anomalies and prolonged heat waves in these same areas, which explain the reduction in corn and bean yields and the consequent stress on food access for the poorest households. The analysis highlights the impact of climate variability, depletion of reserves, and high prices for basic food items.

III. HIGHLIGHTS

EVOLUTION OF FACTORS INFLUENCING FOOD SECURITY IN 2025

La seguridad alimentaria es un fenómeno multidimensional que depende tanto de factores internos a los hogares, como de variables externas que condicionan las posibilidades de acceso, disponibilidad, utilización y estabilidad alimentaria. Las variables de PREDISAN para el presente análisis son:

Agroclimatic variables: AEVI (Enhanced Vegetation Anomaly Index), NDVI (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index), and ISP (Standardized Precipitation Index).

Economic variables: Economic growth, GDP per capita, employment, food prices, ease of starting a business, inflation, remittances, and poverty rates that impact the food security of the most vulnerable households.

Social Variables and Conflicts: This section includes public investment in social protection, remittances sent by migrants, and violence (in various forms) that affect access to goods, services, and resources.

The z-score is a statistic that indicates how many standard deviations a value is from the average of a historical series. It allows us to identify anomalies, both positive and negative, in the data analyzed. PREDISAN uses this tool to easily monitor multiple monthly variables related to food security, detecting significant variations that could anticipate risks or crises and facilitating a timely response based on objective evidence.

Below are the results of the monitoring of these variables provided by PREDISAN for each country, supplemented with updated information based on official consumer price index values from official entities in Central America. These drivers and variables are explained in more detail below.

Table 1. Main drivers of food security

FOOD SECURITY DRIVERS		OUTLOOK Q3 2025			
		GT	HN	SL	NI
AGROCLIMATIC					
	Standardized precipitation index (SPI)				
	Anomaly of the Enhanced Vegetation Index (AEVI)				
	Agricultural production				
	Impact of disasters and extreme weather events				
ECONOMIC					
	Prices of basic foodstuffs				
	Inflation				
	International coffee price				
	Exchange rate				
SOCIALES Y DE CONFLICTO					
	Public investment and social protection				
	Official development assistance (ODA)				
	Remittances				
	Violence and conflict				

CAPTION

Variable with very positive evolution (z-score >1)
Variable with positive evolution (0.25<z-score <1)
Variable with negative evolution (-1<z-score<-0.25)
Variable with very negative evolution (-1<z-score)
Variable with evolution similar to the historical series average (-0.25<z-score<+0.25)

Source: own elaboration with data from PREDISAN

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 2025

Under normal conditions, the agricultural calendar in Central America is structured around two major cycles. The first planting season, which begins between April and May with the arrival of the first rainy season, is harvested between August and September.

Subsequently, the second planting season begins in August–September, taking advantage of the second rainy season, with harvesting in November–December. This pattern plays a key role: it helps to cushion the food shortage period (May–August), when reserves from the previous season are depleted and dependence on the purchase of basic grains increases.

The year 2025 was marked by high climate variability. Climate monitoring reports from PREDISAN[1] for July–August 2025 coincide with information from FEWS NET[2] in pointing to rainfall deficits, high temperatures, and pest proliferation in large areas of the Dry Corridor, which delayed planting and reduced yields.

Figure 1. Seasonal agricultural and food security calendar in Central American countries.



Source: Own elaboration

In the agricultural calendar, the number of days without rain during the dry season between July and August can be a decisive factor in crop yields, which was the case in certain areas of Central America (see Figures 2, 3, and 4). The behavior of the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI)[3] for July and August 2025 is presented below.

[1] PREDISAN es un sistema que compila, analiza y sintetiza información masiva relacionada con la seguridad alimentaria en Centroamérica. PREDISAN permite realizar predicciones o nowcasting una técnica que combina datos en tiempo real y modelos estadísticos para estimar el estado actual de un fenómeno, en este caso la seguridad alimentaria, cuando no están disponibles fuentes oficiales o resulta muy caro realizar monitoreos periódicos1. PREDISAN aprovecha información satelital, información primaria de encuestas, fuentes de datos no convencionales como menciones en noticias publicadas o redes sociales e incluso registros de conflictos, para modelar la inseguridad alimentaria. Mediante herramientas como el procesamiento de lenguaje natural y modelos de regresión, el PREDISAN permite identificar tendencias actuales de inseguridad alimentaria con alta precisión y en diversos contextos regionales.

[2] https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/centroamerica-y-norte-de-suramerica-monitoreo-remoto-julio-29-2025 y https://edcintl.cr.usgs.gov/downloads/sciweb1/shared/fews/web/Seasonal%20Monitors/Central_South%20America/2025/Central_South%20America%20Seasonal%20Monitor%20-%20August%202025.pdf

[3] The Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) is a metric that evaluates deviations in accumulated precipitation from the historical average, allowing anomalies such as droughts or excessive rainfall to be identified in each period.

Figure 2. SPI for July 2025 in Central America



Figure 3. SPI for August 2025 in Central America



Source: PREDISAN

In contrast, some areas experienced excess moisture, creating a complex and uneven scenario (Figures 2 and 3) when comparing July and August 2025. The most critical impacts with reduced precipitation are found in Guatemala, with the north and some areas of southern Nicaragua being the most affected. In Honduras, the impact is concentrated in the east and northwest of the country, while in Nicaragua it combines with an area of above-average humidity for the period in the south of the country. Corn is highly sensitive to water stress between July and August, during the flowering and grain formation stage, when precipitation fell to the levels indicated, affecting crop development (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Sensitivity to water stress in corn



Source: adapted from https://maize.seedsforfuture.eu/es/consejos-tecnicos/implementacion/

The **Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI, 2020–2025, Figure 5)** series confirms this trend of **climate volatility:** following an extreme rainfall event in 2021 (SPI > +3), the region has alternated between droughts and excess rainfall, revealing a pattern that destabilizes traditional agricultural strategies.

Figure 5. SPI as of August 2025 in Central America. Boxes with values for July and August



Source: PREDISAN

The z-score values show a reduction in the precipitation index in the two consecutive months, except in El Salvador, which had a normal variation for August 2025.

This dual **pattern—drought in the Dry Corridor vs. excess moisture in the Caribbean strip of Honduras—highlights the fragility of subsistence agricultural systems,** which are highly dependent on narrow windows of precipitation. Combined with the **high cost of inputs and basic foodstuffs**, this scenario is a **driver of food insecurity toward 2026**, with a particular impact on small producers and agricultural day laborers. Although the standardized precipitation index then normalizes, the late onset of the rainy season and the prolonged heat wave have confirmed negative effects on first-season production in several areas.

In **Guatemala**, the anomaly has caused a reduction or loss of first crops and harvests, as well as a delay and loss of the second harvest, given that July recorded less precipitation (z-score = -1.17) than the historical period (2020-2024), after May also recorded a reduction compared to the same historical period (z-score = -1.15).

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN CHIQUIMULA (2025)

Monitoring by the **Municipal Rural Extension Agency (AMER)** and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food in Chiquimula confirms losses in corn production in 2025. Corn and beans suffered a phenological delay due to the **prolonged heat wave** and **low rainfall** (31–38 days without rain and only 83.5 mm accumulated as of August). Crops in low and medium strata reached the **point of permanent wilting**, causing irreversible damage and an **estimated loss of 84% of the corn harvest** in the department, which was corroborated by the Action Against Hunger team in communities and municipalities in Chiquimula. A representative of the COCODE (Community Council for Development Coordination) of the community of El Sauce, Chiquimula, said: *"I think I will only have 30% of the harvest compared to a normal year [...] and it will last me until January."* In other words, his reserves will last until January 2026, when his reserves normally last until April or May in a good harvest period. The affected area covers **28,549** hectares, and it is estimated that **33,670 families** are now in a situation of food insecurity *(MAGA Chiquimula, September 2025)*.

The lack of rainfall contrasted with the minimum requirement of **700 mm** to complete the corn cycle, which anticipates lower local production and upward pressure on market prices. The **phenology observed in the field was corroborated by the Action Against Hunger technical team during their visit at the end of August 2025**, confirming the magnitude of the impact on smallholder plots in the Dry Corridor.

Source: Report on losses of basic grains in the flowering stage, August and September 2025 (AMER and MAGA Chiquimula).
Photo: Juan Mendoza, Action Against Hunger, August 26, 2025.

FOOD PRICES

The prices of major grains and household incomes have a direct impact on food security. Wholesale prices in Guatemala, used as a benchmark for the rest of Central America, reflect current trends. The price of corn in the third week of September 2025 remains below the price level for the same month last year (-7.6% at USD 0.14/lb. and -2.49% at USD 0.27/lb. for yellow and white corn, respectively). The market is supplied by imported yellow corn and, to a lesser extent, by storage reserves, as domestic production is still awaiting the peak harvest season. The supply comes from grain stored in the northern regions and the Transversal Strip of Northern Guatemala, as well as corn of Mexican origin[4] (see Figure 6).

The price of premium black beans also remains low compared to the previous year, at USD 0.82/lb., down 18.96% from September 2024. This is due to grain reserves in northern and eastern Guatemala, supplemented by low-priced imported beans and the harvest in some of the country's producing areas[5] (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Historical Corn Price trends through September 2025



Source: PREDISAN

The price of premium white rice has remained constant over the last two months. There is a continuous supply in the markets and availability of domestically stored rice and imports. Although the current price level is slightly above that recorded in the same month (September) of the last four years at USD 0.59/lb. (1.29% compared to September 2024), this is due to international market factors and does not affect the availability of the product at the local level. Domestic profits report sufficient stocks to maintain regular supply in the coming weeks[6]).

EXCHANGE RATE

Finally, the exchange rate is stable for El Salvador and Nicaragua, with an appreciation of the quetzal against the dollar in Guatemala and a depreciation of the Honduran currency (see Figure 7) in line with historical z-score behavior. In the last year (September 2024-September 2025), Honduras experienced a fall in the value of its currency against the US dollar, with a reduction in the trend in the last quarter. The anomaly translates into more lempiras per dollar exchanged (depreciation of the lempira). Guatemala shows the opposite situation, with an anomaly since September 2023 that translates into fewer quetzals per dollar exchanged (appreciation of the quetzal).

Figure 7. Historical exchange rate behavior in Central America



Source: PREDISAN

[4] MAGA weekly price report, September 15-19, 2025.
[5] MAGA weekly price report, September 15-19, 2025.
[6] MAGA weekly price report, September 15-19, 2025.

TARIFFS AND PROTECTIONISM

The protectionist shifts in the US, with the imposition of a 10% base tariff on imports and plans for differentiated scales by country/sector, along with changes in foreign policy, has created an atmosphere of uncertainty. During 2025, a 90-day pause was applied to tariffs above that threshold while conditions were renegotiated. The pause ended in July, but negotiations continue. If the higher levels are reactivated, Nicaragua would face an 18% tariff, and other countries in the region would be exposed to additional measures, increasing uncertainty for agricultural exporters in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Legal and consulting sources emphasize the need to review contracts, costs, and supply chains, and confirm the validity of the 10% blanket tariff with sectoral and agreement-based exceptions (e.g., United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement). Trade policy analysis warns that these tariffs are already affecting Latin America and that China's behavior (demand and industrial policy) could amplify impacts on commodity prices.

COFFEE PRICES AND TRADE TENSIONS

Coffee[7] accounts for a large part of this risk due to tariff effects. In August 2025, the ICO Composite Index (I-CIP) averaged 297.05 US¢/lb., 14.6% higher than in July and 24.3% above August 2024, marking a window of historically favorable prices. The categories of Colombian Mild's and Other Mild's—where exports from Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador are classified—exceeded US ¢366/lb., with monthly increases ranging from 12.5% and 13.8%. The following figure shows the behavior with a historic peak in March 2025 over a 25-year period of the time series, maintaining high prices, although declining with a z-score of 3.34 in June 2025 (in February 2025 it reached a z-score of 4.36).

Figure 8. International coffee price trends



Source: PREDISAN

In terms of trade, in July 2025, exports from Mexico and Central America grew 7.2% year-on-year to 1.63 million bags (60 kg), accumulating an increase of 11.1% in the 2024/25 cycle (Oct–Jul). The upturn is mainly explained by Honduras and Nicaragua, which together exported 0.78 million bags in July, compared to 0.66 million in July 2024 (+19.1%). Production in 2024/25 is expected to reach 5.45 million bags in Honduras and 2.69 million in Nicaragua, after historic lows[8] in 2023/24.

However, price volatility (11% in August) and trade tensions in the US limit the ability of small Central American producers to fully capitalize on this upward cycle. Access to the US market is critical, given that between 93% and 94% of coffee production in Honduras and Nicaragua is destined for export, and the US is a dominant buyer.

While international prices offer coffee growers some respite after years of volatility, the threat of new tariff measures and high production and input costs maintain the sector's vulnerability.

[7] https://www.ico.org/documents/cy2024-25/cmr-0825-e.pdf
[8] https://ico.org/documents/cy2024-25/cmr-0825-e.pdf

REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION

Remittances continue to be a fundamental source of support for millions of families in Central America, covering a large part of their daily expenses. These flows have enabled millions of rural and urban households to cushion the impact of inflation and job insecurity. In 2025 (January-July), flows to the region reached record levels compared to the same period in 2024: from January to July 2025, Guatemala received $14.4937 billion (+19.9%) in remittances *(Banguat, 2025)*. The figures from the central banks of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua for the same period show the following comparisons with the same period in 2024: El Salvador received $5,710.2 million (+18.6%), Honduras received $6,914.7 million (+25.2%), and Nicaragua accumulated $1,943.1 million (+22.2%) in the first four months, confirming a positive trend and setting historic figures. The most recent estimates for August and September exceed these growth rates.

This behavior is related to recent US measures—including a 1% tax on international transfers and stricter immigration restrictions—which are causing concern about a possible contraction in remittances from 2026 onwards, directly affecting the food purchasing power of households dependent on this income. Remittance flows to Central America from the United States remain highly sensitive to changes in US trade and immigration policies, so a reduction in this source of foreign exchange could exacerbate dependence on the purchase of basic grains in rural areas with a high proportion of the population dependent on them.

Analyses by the Tri-national CIF (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) show that remittances are a key factor in mitigating food insecurity: in the October 2024–February 2025 projections, a slight improvement was expected precisely because of the increase in income from agricultural trade and remittances. In Honduras, the CIF (Dec. 2024–Nov. 2025) emphasizes that internal and external migration has become a subsistence strategy for households affected by unemployment and crop losses; although remittances alleviate immediate pressures, in the long term they erode social cohesion and affect the community structure[9].

Given the risk of falling remittances, persistent inflation, agricultural losses, and setbacks in informal employment, **poverty is expected to increase in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua in 2026.** Studies show that reductions in remittances have direct effects on poverty increases (e.g., 6% for El Salvador, ~1% for Guatemala) and that poverty and inequality are structural factors associated with increased violence and petty crime[10]. Therefore, we propose closely monitoring indicators such as minor crime rates, reports of community violence, petty theft, as well as socioeconomic variables (family income, access to services) as early warning signs of deterioration.

SOCIAL VARIABLES: HUNGER AND CONFLICT

Violence, social unrest, and food insecurity. Food insecurity in some Central American territories is linked to socio-political conflicts and episodes of violence that have been little studied in the region to date. In these areas, factors such as poverty, inequality, and the weakening of the state exacerbate the problem. An increase in violence or conflict disrupts or hinders the livelihoods of vulnerable populations, thereby increasing food insecurity. In departments such as Copán and Colón in Honduras, where chronic violence and prolonged droughts converge, there has been a notable increase in the population that has migrated in search of security and sustenance[11].

PREDISAN also incorporates an analysis of data from ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), a global registry that collects geolocated information on conflicts, political violence, and protests, recording actors, dates, locations, and type of event. Below is an analysis of how events of violence against civilians, as well as protests and riots, have evolved in Central America over the last nine months of 2025.

There has been a decline in violent events of various kinds recorded in CA4 over the last 12 months, as can be seen in Figure 9 for all five forms of violence. Violence against civilians and clashes are the forms that show the greatest reduction compared to the others.

[9] https://reliefweb.int/report/el-salvador/el-salvador-honduras-y-nicaragua-informe-de-monitoreo-remoto-seguridad-alimentaria-mejora-por-mayor-rendimiento-agricola-que-en-2023-octubre-2024

[10] https://economia.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/eco.413 https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0185-16672021000400098 https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36540168/

[11] Bermeo, S., & Leblang, D. (2021). Honduras migration: Climate change, violence, & assistance. *Duke Univ. Cent. Int. Dev*.

Figure 9. Evolution of violent events recorded in CA4 from July to September 2025



Source: PREDISAN based on ACLED

The z-score shows a decline in the July-September quarter, except for the unrest in August. Table 2 shows a breakdown of the number of cases recorded for each type of violence and the concentration of events in Honduras in first place and Guatemala in second. Protests account for 47.6% of the incidents and violence against civilians (second place) for 37.7%.

Table 2. Violent events recorded by type of event according to country

EVENTS	EL SALVADOR	GUATEMALA	HONDURAS	NICARAGUA	TOTAL	%
Disturbances	3	38	38	0	**79**	4.7
Head-to-head	6	97	57	3	**163**	9.8
Explosions/remote violence	0	3	1	0	**4**	0.2
Protests	112	246	431	6	**795**	**47.6**
Violence against civilians	6	260	357	6	**629**	**37.7**
TOTAL	**127**	**644**	**884**	**15**	**1670**	100.0

Source: PREDISAN with data from ACLED

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The July-September 2025 quarter reveals a dual context in terms of agroclimatic, economic, social, and violence factors.

- In Guatemala, between May and August 2025, an estimated 3.4 million people (19% of the national population) were in a crisis situation or worse according to the IPC report (Phase 3+), around 400,000 more than in 2024. Eleven departments, including Alta Verapaz, Chiquimula, Huehuetenango, Petén, and Sololá, were classified as Phase 3 (Crisis). For the period September 2025–January 2026, the IPC projects a reduction to 2.6 million people (14%), and a further deterioration to 3 million people (16%) between February and April 2026.
- In Honduras, the national IPC report indicates that for April-July 2025, during seasonal hunger, 1.7 million (17%) were projected to be in Phase 3+, with the greatest severity in Gracias a Dios (50%), Colón (25%), and Atlántida (22%).
- The least favorable factors for food security are reflected in agroclimatic variables. The SPI1 (precipitation index for the last month -July 2025-) indicates a moderate drought (low soil moisture and crop stress) in several municipalities, more widespread in Guatemala and parts of Nicaragua's dry corridor. There is evidence of damage to the first harvest in municipalities in the east of the country. On the other hand, areas of the Caribbean are experiencing above-normal rainfall (Honduras and Nicaragua).
- Coffee prices are well above historical prices, and the increase in family remittances between January and July 2025 is on an upward trend, above the historical average. However, they are related to precautionary measures due to the tax on remittances effective as of January 2026 and the restrictive immigration policy for Central American migrants in the United States. These sources of foreign exchange have increased and improved the food security of families, but they need to be monitored in the coming months.
- El Salvador and Nicaragua show stability in the exchange rate against the US dollar; Honduras shows a deterioration of the Lempira, and Guatemala shows an appreciation of the Quetzal.
- Evidence gathered through PREDISAN, and other sources shows a temporary reduction in the most severe levels of food insecurity but also confirms the persistence of critical hotspots in historically vulnerable areas, such as western Guatemala, the Dry Corridor of Honduras, Guatemala, and the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua.
- Humanitarian funding for 2025 is well below the needs identified in the Humanitarian Response Plans. To date, only 17.2% of the required funding for Guatemala and 10.2% for Honduras has been covered. Next year, the situation may be worse, as Central American countries will not have humanitarian response plans in place.
- Declining funds and migratory pressure pose latent threats that could quickly reverse the progress made.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Monitor and evaluate in the last quarter of **2025 the results of the first and last harvests in vulnerable households** that depend on subsistence agriculture and are most affected by precipitation anomalies, as well as update the humanitarian needs of affected families.

Monitor **the economic and social factors related to migration and remittances**, which, after rising in recent months, could decline sharply in the coming months, especially from 2026 onwards, depending on the evolution of US migration policy.

Promote rural productive resilience through investments in sustainable agricultural practices and financial risk protection mechanisms.

Consolidate monitoring systems that enable early action in response to threats, maximizing the use of innovative tools such as PREDISAN and other sources of information that increase the cost-efficiency of monitoring and humanitarian intervention.

Ensure the production of information and coordination among actors to monitor the food security situation and issue alerts to activate the humanitarian response system if necessary.

CENTRAL AMERICAN FOOD SECURITY OUTLOOK

THIRD QUARTER 2025

ACTION AGAINST HUNGER

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